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Abstract 
This paper explores the representational practices of feminist theorising around gender and 
violence. Adapting Liz Kelly’s notion of the continuum of women’s experiences of sexual 
violence, I argue that ‘continuum thinking’ can offer important interventions which unsettle 
binaries, recognise grey areas in women’s experiences and avoid ‘othering’ specific 
communities. Continuum thinking allows us to understand connections whilst nevertheless 
maintaining distinctions that are important conceptually, politically, legally. However, this is 
dependent upon recognising the multiplicity of continuums in feminist theorising – as well 
as in policy contexts – and the different ways in which they operate. A discussion of 
contemporary theory and policy suggests that this multiplicity is not always recognised, 
resulting in a flattening of distinctions which can make it difficult to recognise the 
specifically gendered patterns of violence and experience. I conclude by considering how 
focusing on men’s behaviour might offer one way of unsettling the contemporary orthodoxy 
which equates gender-based violence and violence against women. 
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Introduction 
This article arose from a mistake. My mistake. 
In April 2015, I was asked to speak about representations of sexual violence at London 
School of Economics’ Gender Commission. When I had to provide a title for the paper, I did 
something not uncommon in academia: I hurriedly gave a title generic enough to enable me 
to work out specifics nearer the time. When that time arrived, I realised I had promised a 
paper on ‘representing gender-based violence’.  Although I had intended to talk about 
men’s sexual violence against women, I had used a gender-neutral umbrella term. My paper 
became about this category error. 
This article continues that work. By beginning with my mistake I want to highlight that this is 
not an investigation of ‘other’ representational practices, but rather of feminist theory 
itself, and its uneven absorption in policy and practice. After all, our linguistic choices are 
fundamentally conceptual (Cameron, 2014, 2016). Our words shape the ways in which it is 
(not) possible to understand the issues at stake, the ways they are legislated against, 
measured and resourced, and the responses which are deemed most urgent and 
appropriate. Yet, writing this article, I have realised how often category errors appear in my 
own work. Another example will illustrate this and introduce key themes to be explored in 
this article. 
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Also in 2015, I co-wrote an application for a PhD studentship entitled ‘Archiving and 
Historicising the Feminist Anti-Violence Movement in Scotland’. The italicised words were, I 
thought, an elegant solution to the problem of naming the movement and a reaction 
against the more common ‘violence against women’ (or VAWi), a term which I think 
problematically implies women’s vulnerability rather than men’s responsibility and omits a 
crucial detail: that this is a movement against violence against women. It implies that we 
accept that violence against women is an unchanging reality and our job is to support 
women in that context. That’s not what I think feminist organisations do, but our language 
makes it easy for others to infer this.  
 
‘Men’s violence against women’ didn’t work either: some of the organisations do not work 
exclusively on men’s violence but, for instance, also work against female genital mutilation 
which typically involves female perpetrators, even if acting in male interests. Indeed, it 
wasn’t even exclusively violence against women: some key organisations also focused on 
men’s sexual abuse of children – boys and girls. Mindful of my LSE ‘mistake’, I also rejected 
the anachronistic, gender-neutral, bureaucratic (Cameron, 2016) ‘gender-based violence’. 
 
And so we arrived at ‘the feminist anti-violence movement’. Our project focuses specifically 
on feminist activism against inter-personal violence but - as Finn Mackay later pointed out – 
the term we chose should also include women’s peace activism. Our labelling had created 
unintended intersections, and new omissions. 
 
This example introduces some of the key tensions in the definition and use of umbrella 
terms in this field. Is our focus on commonalities among victims (violence against women), 
perpetrators (men’s violence), meaning (gendered or gender-based violence; sexual 
violence), or a theoretical and political approach (feminist)? This article focuses on varied 
conceptual intersections which feminists have sought to forge between different 
experiences and understandings of violence, and on the umbrella terms which have come to 
define the field. To discuss feminist approaches to connectivity, I introduce the term 
‘continuum thinking’. This draws on Liz Kelly’s (1988) influential work on women’s 
experiences of sexual violence in which she argues that the pervasive nature of men’s sexual 
violence means that women make sense of individual actions in relation to a continuum of 
related experiences across a lifetime. For Kelly, the continuum can allow us to identify a 
‘basic common character that underlies many different events’ and/or ‘a continuous series 
of elements or events that pass into one another and cannot be readily distinguished’ 
(1988: 76). Kelly’s work has been adopted and adapted in a wide range of contexts to 
expose and explore connections between gender and violence. However, as contexts and 
connections vary, I argue here that it is necessary to think about continuums in the plural.  
 
In the next section, I use ‘domestic abuse’ to begin to explore the implications of different 
ways of situating specific forms of men’s violence against women. Naming practices make 
more or less visible who is doing what to whom, and foreground differing sets of 
connections. This leads into a discussion of continuum thinking in relation to ‘gender-based 
violence’, focusing on femicide to explore forms of connection this enables. This additionally 
opens up a consideration of some of the complexities of linking women’s and children’s 
experiences. The discussion of feminist debates about pornography and/as gender-based 
violence against women which follows, unravels some of the benefits and limitations of 
expansive definitions of violence encompassing representation as well as action. Finally, I 
turn my attention to continuum thinking as a means of analysing men’s behaviours, 
suggesting that this challenges the equation of ‘gender-based violence’ with ‘violence 
against women’.  Nevertheless, my aim is not to advocate for uniformity in language or 
claim that one term is necessarily ‘better’ (more feminist) than another. In fact, my 
argument is the opposite of this: namely, that the value of continuum thinking is to see 
connections not equivalences, and so to insist on the importance of distinctions. 
  
 
From naming the abuse to gender neutrality 
 
Debates about naming are essentially about context and connection: what else is this like? 
In Women’s Liberation Movement activism, finding a language for women’s experiences of 
abuse – previously normalised or rendered invisible - was crucial. Feminist consciousness-
raising allowed women to identify and understand the gendered, structural nature of their 
individual experiences of male violence. This allowed women to name certain forms of 
men’s violence and abuse for the first time - wife-battering (Dobash and Dobash, 1979), 
incest (Armstrong, 1978), sexual harassment (MacKinnon, 1979). This process of uncovering 
women’s experiences and naming abuse has continued up to recent work on, for example, 
technology-facilitated sexual violence (Henry and Powell, 2015a, 2015b) or image-based 
abuse (McGlynn et al., 2017). But what is important about feminist naming practices is that 
they take place within an analysis of patriarchy in which an understanding of gender 
inequality is essential. Across different contexts (public/ private; offline/online), 
relationships (intimate/ familial/ collegial/ acquaintance/ stranger), temporalities (one-off/ 
repeated/ sustained) and cultures, feminists ask what these experiences have in common – 
and how they differ?  
 
As knowledge and understanding of the issues has shifted, so too has our language. For 
example, early work on men’s abuse of their intimate partners often used terms like ‘wife 
battering’. As our understandings of intimate relationships and the spectrum of men’s abuse 
of women within those contexts developed, this language changed. The relationship of 
perpetrator to victim is still understood to define this kind of abuse (highlighted by terms 
such as domestic or intimate partner), but language which implies only physical assault 
(violence, battering) has been questioned. Can ‘abuse’ better encapsulate the range of 
physically, emotionally, financially and sexually controlling behaviours women experience? 
Or does this minimise the severity of specific violent incidents? Feminists have also been 
critical of the use of ‘domestic’ and ‘intimate’ as qualifiers, arguing that they imply a less 
severe form of violence, and the complicity of victims (Pain, 2014: 534). As these examples 
suggest, finding the right language remains a challenge, not least because of the need to 
allow women to name the everydayness of their experiences on the one hand, without 
minimising the severity (and, implicitly, criminality) of specific experiences on the other.  
 
More recently, ‘coercive control’ (Stark, 2009) has entered the lexicon as a way of trying to 
address this problem, focusing on conceptualising domestic abuse as ongoing and 
cumulative. Stark’s work highlights the ways in which men’s physical abuse of female 
partners is interwoven with intimidation, isolation and control such that the meaning of 
individual actions cannot be understood independent of the broader context in which they 
occur. An act which may seem innocuous in another context can be experienced very 
differently as part of a pattern of behaviour extending over decades: echoing Kelly’s 
conceptualisation of the continuum of women’s experiences over a lifetime.  
 
Although coercive control is becoming more widely understood in policy contexts, the 
gendered analysis of domestic abuse is inconsistently maintained. Stark’s work is, in part, a 
response to inter/national surveys which find more equivalence in men’s and women’s rates 
of victimisation within intimate partnerships than might be expected (Walby et al., 2017). As 
Kelly and Westmarland (2014) argue, such suggestions of equivalence arise from attempts 
to define domestic abuse both through individual incidents (a punch, slap, etc.) and through 
controlling behaviours of long duration. A single push can be given the same statistical 
weight as repeated threats to kill. 
 
Indeed, it is now becoming increasingly common to see a ‘dual focus’ (Walby et al., 2017: 
24) on ‘violence against women and domestic violence’ (Council of Europe, 2011: 1) or 
‘gender-based and intimate partner violence’ (EIGE, 2015: 20) in policy contexts. This seems 
intended to acknowledge the experiences of male victims as well as the abuse of both 
women and men in same-sex partnerships (on the basis of victimisation surveys referred to 
above). But conjoining these terms implies that domestic abuse is not violence against 
women, or gender-based violence. It means losing sight of the specific feminist analysis of 
men’s abuse of women in intimate relationships. This is not to deny the existence of 
women’s violence against intimate partners of any gender. More simply, it is to ask what we 
gain by making connections based on the status of the relationship rather than the broader 
socio-cultural context in which that relationship – and the people in it – exist.  
 
Notably – unlike wife battering – terms like domestic abuse, intimate partner violence and 
even coercive control are gender neutral. Indeed, Stark acknowledges the particular 
intersections coercive control brings to the fore: 
 
At the core of coercive control theory is the analogy to other capture crimes like 
hostage taking or kidnapping, a comparison that illustrates what Elizabeth Schneider 
calls its ‘generality.’ […] The singular advantage of the analogy is that it links women’s 
predicament in personal life to the larger discourse of rights and liberties we apply to 
citizen-victims, including the human rights discourse, implicitly undermining a major 
rationale that limits justice intervention in what are deemed just family matters. By 
using the gender-neutral language of power and control to frame abuse, the hostage 
analogy also supports an approach women have repeatedly used to gain legal rights 
men already possess, such as the right to vote or sit on juries.  
(Stark, 2009: 365) 
 
Stark is not alone in seeing benefits in linking men’s routinised abuse of women in intimate 
partnerships with a ‘larger’, gender-neutral discourse. Catharine MacKinnon, for instance, 
has argued for conceptualising rape as torture (1993a) and Rachel Pain (2012, 2014) has 
made compelling connections between global terrorism and domestic abuse. However, 
situating rape and domestic abuse – most commonly experienced by women in private - in 
relation to hostage-taking, torture and terrorism runs the risk that women’s experiences of 
male violence can only be recognised analogously - when they can be related to experiences 
of violence in which victims are not, typically, targeted because of their gender. As Clare 
McGlynn (2008) notes in relation to MacKinnon’s rape-as-torture argument, there is also a 
danger that using such extreme analogies disguises or minimises – not least to women 
themselves (Gavey, 2005) – experiences of male violence which do not cause explicit or 
long-term injury or fear. There is a curious paradox here: men’s violence against women is 
most visible when its gendered dimension is denied and when it looks most like men’s own 
experiences of extreme violence (also Nayak and Suchland, 2006: 472).  
 
 
Continuities in meaning: gender-based violence 
 
Although I have focused so far on men’s violence against women, the ‘basic common 
character’ underlying women’s experiences of abuse is not always a male perpetrator, but 
rather the broader social meaning of the abuse: that women are targeted because they are 
women. This is now commonly taken as the basis of definitions of violence as gender based. 
Indeed, in international policy contexts violence against women is increasingly defined as 
violence which is gender based: ‘Violence against women (VAW) is a form of gender-based 
violence that affects women excessively as it is directly connected with the unequal 
distribution of power between women and men, which perpetuates the devaluation and 
subordination of women and violates women’s fundamental rights and freedoms.’ (EIGE, 
2015: 3) 
 
In this widely-used definition, violence against women is a subset of gender-based violence. 
The terms are not strictly synonymous, although they are often treated as such (Nayak and 
Suchland, 2006: 468). What do we gain from thinking about violence against women (an 
umbrella concept which centres the experiences of women as victims/survivors of violence) 
as gender-based violence (an umbrella concept which focuses on the meaning of violence, 
rather than the identities of victims or perpetrators)?  
 
A useful example for considering this question is the term ‘femicide’ (Radford and Russell, 
1992). The coining of this term is not (only) a question of semantics - highlighting the 
linguistic male assumption in homicide - but rather names a specific form of homicide: the 
murder of women because they are women. This is differentiated not only from male 
homicide but also from the murder of women in other contexts (e.g. indiscriminate spree 
shootings). Femicide tells us both who the victim is and why they have been targeted. 
 
Although femicide remains under-researched (Weil, 2016), one of the advantages of 
conceptualising the murder of women because they are women - as distinct from female 
homicide - is that it allows us to understand femicide on the continuum of (men’s) violence 
against women (Radford and Russell, 1992). As, globally, women are far more likely than 
men to be murdered by an intimate partner or family member (Walby et al., 2017: 2; 
Dobash and Dobash, 2015), this brings into view the inter-connections of femicide and 
men’s abuse of women in intimate relationships and allows us, for instance, to make sense 
of women’s (rational) fear of leaving abusive men (Stark, 2009; Dobash and Dobash, 2015: 
28).  
 
Yet, theorising femicide as the murder of women because they are women does not, 
necessarily, presuppose a male perpetrator. One area of femicide which sometimes involves 
female perpetrators is lethal ‘honour-based’ violence.ii Aisha Gill (2011) argues that placing 
‘honour-based’ violence on the continuum of gender-based violence against women allows 
us to see continuities across cultures, challenging the notion that cultural values provide a 
unique justification for these crimes. This is particularly significant when the communities 
that perpetrate ‘honour-based’ violence are (ethnic) minorities within a dominant cultural 
context (such as South Asian communities in the UK). Here the continuum becomes a 
powerful tool in resisting the ‘othering’ of these communities, instead understanding the 
connections between violence against women in the name of ‘honour’ and forms of gender-
based violence against women in the dominant culture, such as domestic abuse (Gill, 2011: 
222). Expanding the continuum in this way means including acts which involve female 
perpetrators (albeit a minority). But asking who benefits helps to keep the role of patriarchal 
structures in view. This leads Nicole Westmarland (2015: xvi) to include honour-based 
violence, forced marriage and female genital mutilation as practices of men’s violences, 
noting that they are ‘acts by women […] used to uphold men’s privilege and support 
women’s inequality’.  
 
In her work on forced marriage, Gill – along with Sundari Anitha – also deploys a continuum 
based on women’s experiences. Anitha and Gill (2009: 165) here refer to consent and 
coercion in relation to marriage as ‘two ends of a continuum, between which lie degrees of 
socio-cultural expectation, control, persuasion, pressure, threat and force’. As with the 
research which led Kelly to propose the continuum of sexual violence (1988), Anitha and Gill 
are able to highlight important connections between women’s everyday experiences – of 
constraints on marital consent – and criminal, violent acts against them. Anitha and Gill are 
interested in two ways of conceptualising forced marriage, then: as part of a ‘continuum of 
choice and coercion’ (2009: 165) linked to limitations imposed by ‘compulsory 
heterosexuality’ (Rich, 1980) and culturally-specific gender roles; and as ‘a specific 
manifestation of a wider problem of violence against women’ (Anitha and Gill, 2009: 166). 
They are concerned with dismantling binary ways of thinking which have disadvantaged 
women (not least in the legal system) when their experiences have occupied a ‘grey area’ in-
between coercion and consent, or violence and non-violence. Of course, these two 
conceptualisations are linked: compulsory heterosexuality is enforced by violence; violence 
is underpinned by constructions of heterosexually-appropriate gender roles (Gavey, 2005). 
But they are not the same: women can and do make positive choices about heterosexuality 
and marriage – which is not to say all women can or do.  
 
In a 2012 article, Kelly notes (2012: xix) that the everyday, routine, intimate intrusions which 
were so key to her respondents’ experiences of sexual violence over the course of a lifetime 
– and thus foundational to the concept of the continuum – dropped off many agendas in the 
intervening years because of the emphasis in much scholarship (and activism) on crime. 
Recent work like Anitha and Gill’s – as well as the Everyday Sexism Project (Bates, 2014), 
Hollaback movement (https://www.ihollaback.org), or Fiona Vera-Gray’s (2016) work on 
street harassment, to give just a few examples– has done much to redress this. One of the 
implications of this approach is that, by focusing on women’s experiences across our life 
cycles, the continuum makes connections between our experiences as adults and girls. 
Whether these connections can then be extended to include the experiences of boy 
children is one of the questions I will now explore.  
 
 
Women, children and gender-based violence 
 
Linking the experiences of women and children has been conceptually important for 
feminist analysis. Firstly, it acknowledges the simultaneity of some forms of men’s abuse of 
women and children (of all genders). In particular, the co-existence of the (domestic) abuse 
of women and children within the same household points to the ‘impossibility of creating 
mutually exclusive categories’ (Kelly et al., 1996: 86). However, where the abuse of women 
and children overlap in this way, the abuse of children also needs to be understood as 
gender based: the children are targeted because of their significance within the household 
gender dynamics, including in cases of murder (Dobash and Dobash, 2015). However, not all 
abuse of children (in the home or outside) is gender based. Terminology such as ‘violence 
against women and children’ can suggest false equivalences between different groups of 
victims and water down a gendered analysis of (men’s) violence.  
 
This is apparent in a Scottish Government (2017) consultation on the draft Delivery Plan for 
Equally Safe, Scotland’s strategy to prevent and eradicate violence against women and girls. 
Despite the emphasis on women and girls in the original Strategy (Scottish Government, 
2014), the draft Delivery Plan ‘explicitly includes children of all genders’ and aims to 
‘improve the lives and experiences of all children affected by violence’ (Scottish 
Government, 2017: 3, emphasis mine). Here, the parallels between women and children 
appear to be drawn on the basis of an assumed shared vulnerability, rather than a gender-
based analysis of why and how women and children are targeted by men in domestic and 
other contexts. Of course, improving the lives and experiences of all children affected by 
violence is essential. But adding ‘children’ into a plan focusing on violence against women 
and girls suggests a conceptual confusion which may have practical implications as very 
different stakeholders (women’s organisations, children’s organisations) make claims on a 
specific, limited, pot of resources. It is important work. But why should it sit within this 
strategy? 
 
In contrast, thinking of continuities in women’s experiences across time allows us to make 
conceptual linkages between child and woman abuse specific to girl children. This highlights 
the everydayness of men’s attempts to control women and girls and the ways in which our 
understandings of our gendered selves are shaped through these (inter)actions from 
childhood onwards. This is not to argue that women and girls are always and only victims 
but rather to consider the diverse ways in which we accommodate, collude, cope, resist and 
survive. It sees victimisation and survival as (moving) points on a continuum, rather than as 
binary and all-consuming identities (Kelly et al,, 1996).iii An individual’s movement across 
this continuum is not uni-directional or strictly chronological (such that, for instance, child 
victim becomes adult survivor). This is a dynamic way of understanding girls’ and women’s 
multi-faceted experiences of victimisation and survival in relation to male violence.  
 
Nevertheless, establishing connections between children and women has opened feminists 
up to criticism that we infantilise women and downplay agency, whether in relation to 
sexual violence (see Kelly, Burton and Regan, 1996 for a discussion) or prostitution and 
pornography (Doezema, 2010). I will consider the challenges in conceptualising pornography 
on a continuum of men’s sexual violence against women in the next section. Here I want to 
highlight that the distinction between children’s and women’s experiences of prostitution 
and pornography is typically configured in relation to sexual consent. Legally, children 
cannot consent to sex and so cannot consent to involvement in prostitution or pornography. 
As the terms ‘prostitution’ and ‘pornography’ foreground sex – and construct perpetrators 
as consumers – to pair either with ‘child’ is to fundamentally distort relations of power, 
control and the impossibility of consent. As such, feminists (and children’s organisations) 
insist on making abuse visible with terms such as ‘child abuse images’ and ‘the abuse of 
children in prostitution’ (Women’s Views on News, 2016). This is important, and brings 
power and the question of who benefits back into the equation.iv 
 
But the possibility of an adult woman’s sexual consent does not magically remove coercion. 
What happens when children abused in pornography become adults and ‘choose’ to 
perform in pornography or ‘work’ in prostitution? Does the harm automatically cease? The 
scare quotes here highlight the extent to which choice is always contingent and the 
conceptualisation of prostitution as sex work is contentious within feminism. This is not to 
say that no woman freely chooses to work in pornography or prostitution – nor is it to 
negate the importance of the possibility of choice, however constrained (Whisnant, 2004). 
However, as with Anitha and Gill’s work on ‘honour-based’ violence, using continuum 
thinking here opens up separate – but interlocking – continuums: ‘a continuum of choice 
and coercion’ which centres women’s and children’s experiences (rather than legal 
definitions of consent); and a continuum of sexual violence (in which not all adult women 
would situate all of their experiences of prostitution and pornography). This unseats any 
binary distinction between child and adult woman without collapsing these experiences into 
one: the advantage of continuum thinking is to identify the ways in which they are related, 
without treating them as synonymous. Further, if we ask the who benefits question this 
allows for a rather different set of connections to be established, conceptualising men’s 
behaviour as buyers of women (and men, and children) in relation to broader ideas about 
men’s sexuality, power and sexual entitlement. The importance of continuum thinking for 
understanding men’s behaviour is something I will return to, but first I want to consider 
another set of challenges pornography poses for continuum thinking. 
 
 
Representational continuums  
 
There is not space here to rehearse the arguments about pornography as/ and violence 
against women, which I have, in any case, summarised elsewhere (Boyle, 2014). Instead, I 
want to consider how continuum thinking helps conceptualise the dual realities of 
pornography as both material practice (real bodies, doing real things) and form of 
representation (staged, photographed, filmed, written, drawn).  
 
Recent strategies to make the abuses of pornography visible have included a challenge to 
the conceptual utility of the term itself. This has been most explicit in debates about so-
called ‘revenge porn’, a term which has become a media stand-in for the non-consensual 
creation or sharing of sexual images. As with critiques of ‘child pornography’, defining these 
practices as pornography can be argued to downplay their seriousness as acts of abuse 
committed by flesh-and-blood perpetrators with real-life consequences for victims 
(McGlynn et al., 2017). Instead, McGlynn, Rackley and Hougton (2017) propose the term 
‘image-based abuse’ in an article which explicitly uses Kelly’s notion of the continuum in two 
ways. Firstly, describing the continuum of image-based abuse allows them to expand the 
discourse beyond ‘revenge porn’ to establish similarities with other forms of image-based 
abuse, including so-called ‘upskirting’,v voyeurism offences, coercive spectatorship and 
sexualised photoshopping. By focusing on women’s experiences, they are able to 
understand connections between practices which are otherwise very different: some 
involving ‘fakery’, others non-consensual production or distribution, but all causing material 
harms.  
 
It is striking that much of the behaviour McGlynn and colleagues describe has been 
facilitated by technological developments. Linking this to the burgeoning scholarship on 
women’s diverse experiences of sexualised abuse online (not all of which are image-based), 
image-based abuse may therefore be conceptualised on a continuum of technology-
facilitated sexual violence (Henry and Powell, 2015a, 2015b) which impacts and constrains 
women’s engagement with the digital public sphere (Tandon et al., 2015; Jane, 2017). More 
broadly than this, McGlynn et al.’s second use of the continuum is to theorise image-based 
abuse as part of Kelly’s (1988) longer continuum of women’s experiences of men’s sexual 
violence. This is important in establishing the ways in which apparently new forms of sexual 
violence are conceptually and experientially similar to more well-documented patterns of 
abuse. As with Anitha and Gill’s work, these conceptualisations thus allow us to see multiple 
connections in different contexts and support the broader argument I am developing here 
about the value of (re)conceptualising Kelly’s continuum in the plural. 
 
Conceptualising pornography per se as (men’s) violence against women remains fraught in 
feminist theory and activism. One of the criticisms often levied at feminists who take this 
approach is that they conflate symbolic violence (patterns of representation) with material 
violence (actions). Although not focusing on pornography specifically, Walby et al. (2017: 
35) note that conflating gender inequality more broadly with violence against women 
specifically, runs the risk of stretching the definition of violence so far that nothing is not 
violence. As such, violence against women can become too amorphous to quantify - or 
resist.  
 
Similar arguments circulate in relation to whether harmful speech should be understood as 
literal violence. Whilst feminists have long highlighted the ways in which speech acts can 
engender harm and produce discrimination (MacKinnon, 1993b), placing threatening speech 
on a continuum of sexual violence should not mean, for instance, equating speech with 
rape. The expansion of the understanding of harmful speech in many contexts to include 
speech causing offence, and the equation of this with literal, physical violence, has, indeed, 
been used to silence feminist critique (Jones, 2015). In classroom settings, an unthinking use 
of the ‘trigger warning’ has worrying implications in terms of closing down discussion on, for 
example, sexual violence (Halberstam, 2016). Whilst there are important discussions to be 
had about trauma, triggers and pedagogy, Jack Halberstam (2016) highlights a ‘paternalistic 
normativity’ in many of these encounters, assuming that survivors’ experiences are uniform, 
that they are uniquely, extremely and permanently vulnerable, and that triggers are always 
literal. Here, it seems that continuum thinking has been abandoned in favour of analogous 
thinking (Cameron, 2014): claiming one thing – speech -is the same as the other (violence), 
rather than being willing to explore the ‘grey area’ which the continuum allows. 
 
I want to insist, then, on the importance of continuum thinking as a means of making 
connections, whilst noting the importance of clarity in relation to the nature of these 
connections and the necessity of distinction within this. This also means thinking about 
continuums in the plural. For instance, the abusive production practices of much audio-
visual pornography are appropriately positioned on a continuum of sexual violence that – to 
take a mainstream example – would not make sense for E.L. James’ novel Fifty Shades of 
Grey (2012). On the other hand, the novel and hard core audio-visual pornography may 
exist on another continuum: a continuum of representations of sexual violence. To deploy 
another concept from Kelly, the representational continuum might provide a conducive 
context (Kelly, 2005, 2016) for additional, material acts of sexual violence: legitimating and 
supporting a culture of male sexual entitlement, dominance and coercive control (Boyle, 
2017). Fifty Shades represents male sexual violence against women, and could be conducive 
to real-world violence, but it is not – in and of itself – violence against women. This is as true 
of the Fifty Shades films as it is of the novels, as (unlike in hardcore) there is an assumption 
that the sex (and sexual violence) is ‘faked’ – representation rather than real – in 
mainstream contexts. 
  
So far, I have highlighted conceptual challenges – as well as advantages – arising from 
continuum thinking centring, to various extents, on women’s experiences. In the final 
section, I want to consider some of the implications of a reorientation to more explicitly 
centre men’s behaviours.  
 
The continuum of men’s violences 
 
One of the key contributions of continuum thinking has been to establish the ways in which 
‘typical’ and ‘aberrant’ male behaviour shades into one another (Kelly, 1988: 75). This 
demands that we pay attention not only to women’s experiences of male behaviour, but 
also to that behaviour itself and how it is rendered meaningful for men. Here, the concept 
of ‘hegemonic masculinity’ is useful, pointing to a pattern of practices – not all of which are 
explicitly abusive, and which are enacted in culture and institutions as well as in gender 
performance and inter-personal relationships – which allow men’s dominance over women 
to continue (Connell and Messerschmidt, 2005: 832). In this final section, I want to argue 
that it can be equally useful to feminist analysis to think of men’s behaviours (rather than 
women’s experiences) on a continuum.  
 
The continuum of men’s violences allows us to think of violence as being gender based not 
because of who it targets but, rather, because of how that violence is understood in relation 
to perpetrators’ gender performances. This can allow us to make gendered sense of 
behaviours which don’t seem to fit comfortably on the continuums we have explored so far.  
 
For instance, in 2012, British entertainer Jimmy Savile was revealed to have been a serial 
sexual predator, his crimes spanning five decades. I have argued elsewhere (Boyle, 2017) for 
the importance of understanding Savile’s crimes as gendered, but this might seem 
counterintuitive: although the majority of Savile’s victims were girls and young women, he 
also abused boys and adult men. Yet, a large part of the reason he got away with it for so 
long was that his ‘aberrant’ behaviour was so clearly foreshadowed in ‘typical’ male 
behaviour which was highly visible and, indeed, celebrated. The way he sexualised his 
encounters with any and every woman and girl was a clear but, crucially, ‘normal’, display of 
male sexual entitlement which both victims and bystanders often struggled to identify as 
abusive or problematic. A woman could not have behaved in the same way. There is no 
doubt that both his behaviour – and institutional blindness to it – was gendered. His sexual 
assaults on men and boys need to be understood in this context, as a further expression of 
his masculine dominance and power (Boyle, 2017).   
 
In the context of male violence against women specifically, Patrizia Romito powerfully 
argues:  
 
it is acceptable to talk about violence, but never about male violence. Here, too, we 
have adapted to this convention so far. Also, the documents of international 
organisations and governments […] talk about violence towards women and children, 
but almost never of male violence, even if they describe husbands raping, maltreating 
and killing their wives. Rereading this text and international documents, in which the 
adjective ‘male’ is added to the word violence, has the effect of a punch in the 
stomach, because it confronts us with a brutal reality. It is this reality we are trying to 
escape from when we use euphemisms or generic and imprecise terms. 
(Romito, 2008: 5) 
 
Whilst I agree with Romito’s argument, I want to take it in a slightly different direction to 
argue that part of the feminist project in naming and documenting men’s violence is making 
the constructed nature of masculinity visible, and hence creating spaces where men’s 
rejection of violent norms is not only possible but desirable. For instance, when women kill 
this is seen as such an aberration that their gender is almost always remarked upon in 
media representations (Boyle, 2005). Yet when men kill, no qualifier is needed: it is assumed 
that a killer (batterer, torturer, terrorist) is male. By marking the term – male killer, male 
terrorist – we demand that rather than taking this conjunction for granted we think about it 
critically. This confronts us with a brutal reality, as Romito suggests, but it can also 
denaturalise male violence. 
 
Is there any advantage of using continuum thinking in relation to this far broader category 
of male violence? Can we, for instance, make connections between global terrorism and 
domestic abuse which are not analogous but reflect ‘a continuous series of elements or 
events that pass into one another and cannot be readily distinguished’ (Kelly, 1988: 76)?  
 
Some of the most high-profile acts of global terrorism and mass killings in recent years were 
committed by men with histories of attacks against known women. Writing in the Guardian, 
Hadley Freeman (2017) suggests a correlation between these men’s gender-based violence 
against known women and their embrace of fundamentalist patriarchal belief systems (‘of 
pretty much any major religion’) which advocate wildly restrictive attitudes towards gender. 
Freeman points to the ways in which - in men’s experiences - different forms of violence can 
serve similar purposes as expressions of patriarchal belief systems. Thus, although – for 
instance – most of the attacks with multiple victims did not specifically target women, 
understanding these attacks as continuous with the perpetrators’ previous violence towards 
known women renders these men decidedly ‘typical’. This also provides a way of 
punctuating the self-aggrandising narratives of male exceptionalism which too often 
circulate around spectacularly abusive men such as terrorists or serial killers (Cameron and 
Frazer, 1987). It allows us to recognise these individuals – and the stories that are told about 
their crimes - as generic, not exceptional (Boyle and Reburn, 2015). 
 
There is also an important point here to be made about the way in which the routine 
minimisation of men’s violence against women (in everyday life as well as in the courts) 
facilitates these more publicly spectacular acts by providing a free pass to perpetrators. In 
Jeff Hearn’s (1998) work with men who abused known women he found that minimisation 
was endemic in men’s accounts of their behaviour. In their work with men who murder 
their intimate partners, Dobash and Dobash (2011, 2015) have similarly documented 
patterns of denial, minimisation, victim-blaming, and deflecting responsibility. These play 
out not only in the way the men talk about their murder convictions, but also more broadly 
in their accounts and expectations of gendered relationships. Whilst making crucial 
connections between lethal and non-lethal violence against women, Dobash and Dobash 
(2011: 114) tellingly note that ‘[e]vidence about the actions and orientations of violent 
abusers and intimate partner murderers parallel reports of men who use violence in other 
contexts, especially violence against other men.’  
 
In this respect, there are advantages to thinking about men’s violence against other men – 
at least in some circumstances – as gender based. However, three important caveats here. 
Firstly, this is not a biological argument: in arguing that this is gender-based violence to the 
extent that it is perpetrated by men because they are men I am referring to the ways in 
which they relate to and embody particular – often normative - constructions of gender 
roles. It is a constructionist, not an essentialist, argument. Secondly, I am arguing for the 
conceptual utility of this approach for understanding (and therefore working to eradicate) 
men’s violence. I am not suggesting that this kind of reconceptualisation would work legally, 
for instance. Finally, whilst this might provide a useful lens through which to consider 
abusive men’s behaviour, it does not necessarily help us to understand men’s experiences 
of victimisation. Men are not necessarily targeted because they are men, nor is their 
experience of victimisation consistent with gender inequality (though it may be consistent 
with other vectors of oppression, such as race or class). There are exceptions of course: the 
explicit targeting of men who are (or seem to be) gay or trans, where they are attacked 
because of their perceived transgressions of dominant gender norms, for instance. But 
insisting that gender is not a synonym for women (and gender-based violence is not 
synonymous with violence against women) is not to argue that we simply add men to 
existing models – built on women’s experiences of victimisation and survival - and stir. 
Women and men are differently positioned in relation to gender-based violence. Placing 
men in gender-based violence, more often means making men visible as perpetrators.  
 
None of this is to deny that women can be perpetrators, or men victims. Rather, it is to 
highlight the conceptual limitations of the ways in which we currently frame gender-based 
violence, and argue that the inter-relationships between gender and violence are more 
multi-faceted than some models suggest. 
 
 
Conclusion: continuing continuum thinking 
 
Continuum thinking has been an essential element of feminist theories of gender violence 
for decades and has become mainstream to the extent that policy and practice is (in some 
contexts) less focused on isolated acts of violence and more sensitive to the ‘grey areas’ of 
women’s experiences and the connections between them. Continuum thinking has allowed 
us to make sense of experiences which had no name – or no name which women recognised 
– and to understand the ways in which gender violence is itself an expression of gender 
inequality. As I have outlined, continuum thinking has posed a series of challenges to 
established binaries such as violence/not violence, victim/survivor, real/virtual, child/adult, 
choice/constraint.  
 
However, the attempt to encapsulate and name the diverse experiences on the continuums 
which link gender and violence has been fraught with difficulty and has not necessarily 
supported feminist ends. In particular, the too-frequent conflation of ‘violence against 
women’ and ‘gender-based violence’ performs a number of erasures which should be of 
concern to feminists.  Simply naming gender does not mean that our analysis is gendered – 
indeed, gender-based violence can be a worryingly gender-neutral term which flattens 
important differences in terms of who is doing what to whom, in which contexts, to which 
effects, and to whose overall benefit. As Sarah Moore’s (2011) work on ‘date rape’ reminds 
us, just because a term starts off doing feminist work does not mean that it continues to do 
so. Further research is certainly warranted into the contexts and conditions in which 
gender-based violence is used – in policy, in practice, in theory, in the media – but this 
article has indicated the extent to which it should be approached (and used) critically and 
with caution in the meantime. 
 
That said, the answer is not to abandon any of these terms or to claim one as inherently 
better (or worse) than the other, but to be alert and critical to the ways in which they are 
used and to think about the – conceptual, political, practical – work they enable us to do. 
We need to be conscious of the basis on which we seek to establish connections. Is our 
focus on commonalities among victims, perpetrators, meaning, kinds of behaviour, or a 
theoretical and political approach? Does our language accurately reflect this focus: do we 
talk about violence against women, men’s violence, gender-based violence, choice and 
coercion, feminism? Obviously we need to be understood and, as Gill’s work on ‘honour-
based’ violence or McGlynn’s on ‘revenge porn’ demonstrates, this sometimes means using 
language we are critical of as a starting point. However, these authors work hard to keep 
the contingency and limitations of the language in view even when they reproduce it in the 
interests of clarity. Sometimes we need to speak in two voices. 
 
This plurality can also be usefully reflected by moving away from conceptualising ‘the’ 
continuum in the singular. What I have called continuum thinking is an important way of 
theorising the inter-relationships of gender and violence, but it also demonstrates that not 
everything is related in the same way and distinctions are important. We can and should be 
more explicit about the intersecting (but non-continuous) use of continuums to theorise 
different aspects of women’s (and children’s) experiences and men’s behaviours. Kelly’s 
related concept of the ‘conducive context’ (2005, 2016) offers another way of 
understanding the broader gendered social, political and cultural conditions which facilitate 
men’s violence against women without watering down the term ‘violence’ so that – as 
Walby et al. (2017: 35) have cautioned – it means everything and nothing.  
In conclusion, whilst insisting on the importance of establishing connections, I am 
nevertheless cautious of a depoliticised or uncritical use of continuum thinking. As the 
‘mistake’ at the beginning of this article attests, umbrella terms can obscure more than they 
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i It would have been less cumbersome to have adopted abbreviations such as VAW (violence 
against women) and GBV (gender-based violence) in this article. However, such acronyms 
are arguably another means of obscuring the gendered specificity of violence and also point 
to an increasingly bureaucratic register (Cameron, 2016). As such, I have resisted the use of 
acronyms unless in direct quotation.  
ii Although commonly used, the term ‘honour’-based violence problematically centres male 
understandings of honour. For a discussion of the term, see Gill (2011). 
iii In her initial formulation of the continuum, Kelly (1988) was careful to note that the 
continuum was neither linear not hierarchical in terms of severity of violence, with the 
important exception of lethal violence. This exception is equally crucial to thinking of 
experiences of victimisation and survival as movable points on a continuum. 
iv Although there is not the space to explore this here, it is important to note that whilst 
there is always a power differential between children abused in prostitution and the men 
who ‘buy’ them, there are grey areas in relation to sexual images of children when produced 
by children of themselves, for themselves. As Henry and Powell (2015a) argue, rather than 
an automatic assumption of a lack of consent in children’s sexting (and an assumption of 
consent in adult practices), thinking of a continuum of consent and coercion in a broader 
gendered social sphere can be helpful in avoiding stigmatising (or even criminalising) 
children for their practices. 
v ‘Upskirting’ involves ‘the consensual taking of images of an individual’s public area 
underneath their outer clothing in public places’ (McGlynn et al., 2017). 
                                                     
